<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Devsecops on My Blog</title><link>https://hugo-blog.aitbytes.dev/tags/devsecops/</link><description>Recent content in Devsecops on My Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hugo-blog.aitbytes.dev/tags/devsecops/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The MCP Attack Surface: What Your Security Team Is Missing About AI Coding Tools</title><link>https://hugo-blog.aitbytes.dev/posts/2026-06-11-mcp-attack-surface-agentic-coding/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://hugo-blog.aitbytes.dev/posts/2026-06-11-mcp-attack-surface-agentic-coding/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The more capable your AI coding assistant gets, the more dangerous it becomes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I know that sounds backwards. Security tools are supposed to get safer as they mature. But with agentic coding tools, the relationship between capability and risk flips in a way that nobody prepared for. Academic research published in April 2026 tested 2,000 attack instances across nine LLMs. The result? The strongest instruction-following models — the ones enterprises actually want to deploy — were the ones most likely to hand an attacker your database credentials.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>We Compared 6 AI Coding Tools on Security. The Gap Between #1 and #2 Is Alarming.</title><link>https://hugo-blog.aitbytes.dev/posts/2026-06-11-agentic-coding-tools-security-comparison/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 11:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://hugo-blog.aitbytes.dev/posts/2026-06-11-agentic-coding-tools-security-comparison/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;One tool has 50 admin-controlled security settings deployable via MDM. Two tools have literally no documented MCP governance at all. One tool can&amp;rsquo;t even let admins disable telemetry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I spent two weeks digging through every piece of public documentation across six agentic coding tools — not marketing pages, not whitepapers, but actual config files, API docs, privacy policies, and security certifications. What I found was a landscape where the distance between best-in-class and &amp;ldquo;we&amp;rsquo;ll figure it out later&amp;rdquo; is measured in light-years, not inches.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>What GitLab Ultimate's Security Scanners Can and Can't Catch</title><link>https://hugo-blog.aitbytes.dev/posts/2026-06-11-gitlab-security-scanners-reality/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://hugo-blog.aitbytes.dev/posts/2026-06-11-gitlab-security-scanners-reality/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;There&amp;rsquo;s a specific kind of disappointment that happens the first time a security team runs GitLab Ultimate&amp;rsquo;s built-in scanners against an application they&amp;rsquo;ve been hardening with Fortify for three years.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The scanner reports clean. The security team knows the application has edge cases. The scanner just can&amp;rsquo;t find them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That&amp;rsquo;s not a bug. It&amp;rsquo;s a category error. And if you&amp;rsquo;re evaluating GitLab Ultimate&amp;rsquo;s security features, understanding this distinction is the difference between a tool that meaningfully improves your security posture and one that generates false confidence.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>